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Abstract
This paper empirically compares a variety of ¯rm-value-based mod-
els of contingent claims. We formulate a general model which takes the
perpetual coupon bond models of Merton (1974), Leland (1994) and An-
derson, Sundaresan and Tychon (1996), as well as some immediate gen-
eralizations thereof, as special cases. We estimate these using aggregate
time series data for the US corporate bond market, monthly, from August
1970 through December 1996. The data are average yields for industrial
corporate bonds rated BBB, Treasury yields, leverage measures derived
from the Flow of Funds Accounts, interest coverage measures derived from
the National Income Accounts, and volatility measures derived from the
stock market. In the basic speci¯cation with constant default free rates,
we ¯nd that models with endogenous bankruptcy barriers (the Leland and
the Anderson, Sundaresan and Tychon models) ¯t quite well. Thus, in
these models, variations of leverage and asset volatility are found to ac-
count for much of the time-series variations of observed corporate yields.
We then use the estimates to calculate the implied probability of default
within N years. We ¯nd under plausible assumptions on the market risk-
premium for levered ¯rms that the models produce default probabilties for
5 years or more which are in line with the historical experience reported
by Moodys.
¤An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Financial Markets Summer Sympo-
sium in Gerzensee, Switzerland, July 1998, and at the Bank of England/ CEPR conference
on Default Risk held in London, September 1998. We appreciate comments from participants
of these seminars and particularly E.Altman, S.Hodges, and W.Perraudin. Responsibility for
all views expressed and all errors is our own.
yIRES, Universit¶ e Catholique de Louvain, and the CEPR. This paper initiated while visit-
ing the Department of Finance, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology. This paper
has been partially supported by a Belgian government grant under the P^ oles d'Attraction
Inter-universitaire Program. Email: anderson@ires.ucl.ac.be.
zGraduate School of Business, Columbia University. Email: ms122@columbia.edu
11 Introduction
In this paper we estimate structural models of corporate bond yields using
monthly observations of yield indices of U.S. investment grade corporate bonds.
Following in the tradition established by Merton [32] structural models of corpo-
rate bonds treat these as contingent claims on the assets of the ¯rm. Variations
in yield are explained by variations in leverage, asset value volatility, and the
riskless interest rate. Interest in structural models of the liabilities of the ¯rm is
motivated in part by theoretical considerations. These contingent claims models
are the extensions of the neoclassical theory of the ¯rm to the case of stochastic
output in continuous time. As such they link the valuation of ¯nancial claims
to economic fundamentals and potentially can be imbedded in an equilibrium
model of the production economy. Further motivation for structural models of
corporate liabilities is provided by past empirical work which has found that cor-
porate yield spreads over government bonds is related to stock market returns
and macroeconomic business cycle indicators (Ja®ee [21] and Du®ee [11]).
Despite the appeal of structural models, they have proved di±cult to im-
plement successfully and are not very widely used in practice. One problem is
that most statistical analyses have employed linear models whereas the theo-
retical models relate yields to fundamental determinants in a highly non-linear
way. Thus these estimates are best viewed as approximations which have veri-
¯ed some of the qualitative predictions of the theory but which cannot be used
directly in pricing. Furthermore, structural models have greater data require-
ments than other approaches. Past serious attempts to implement the Merton
model on U.S. corporate bonds proved disappointing (Jones, Mason, and Rosen-
feld [23] [24]). The models did not ¯t very well and tended to systematically
underestimate observed yields when plausible values of asset volatility were em-
ployed. In commenting on these results, Fisher Black [5] noted, \This is a costly
model. It uses a lot of computer time. At the end of it all the average error in
pricing bonds is 6%. I am surprised that Jones et al are able to create a model
with such a large error."
In the face of these results practitioners have tended to adopt pragmatic
solutions which attempt to infer fair yields from market yields of other traded
instruments that are comparable with respect to rating and maturity. In the
simplest application this gives rise to \matrix pricing" where the yield of a given
issue is derived from a set of yields of traded benchmarks using ad hoc rules
for interpolation. Recently a number of advances have been made which give
a rigorous statistical basis for inferring issue yields from market benchmarks.
Important studies of these so-called \reduced form" models of corporate yields
include Litterman and Iben [27], Jarrow and Turnbull[22] and Du±e and Single-
ton [12] [13]. This approach draws upon developments in the 1980's in modelling
the default-free term structure. In particular, these have introduced a variety
of °exible functional forms giving the conditional probability of default. The
results have been encouraging, and these reduced form models are useful in
2some practical applications. However, there are important limitations to this
approach.
These studies have proposed a variety of °exible functional form which may
be calibrated to a given set of benchmarks. Two di®erent forms calibrated to
the same benchmarks may imply signi¯cantly di®erent values when pricing some
other issue. Thus predicted value depends upon the choice of functional form,
a choice which may not be fully determined on the basis of goodness of ¯t.
A second problem with reduced form models is that for many pricing prob-
lems there are no reliable benchmarks. In this case one would like to establish
values from ¯rst principles. For example, suppose that a given company has
a single 5 year bond outstanding. One might assume that such a bond could
be priced using a model calibrated to the generic zero-coupon curve for issues
carrying the same rating (see e.g., Litterman and Iben for this approach). Sup-
pose the resulting yield prediction is signi¯cantly below the market yield for
this security. Does this represent a trading opportunity or does it indicate that
the risks of this security are signi¯cantly greater than those of the average secu-
rity within its rating class? It is di±cult to know how to answer this question
without reference to fundamentals.
A third limitation to corporate bond pricing using a °exible reduced form
model calibrated o® of closely related issues is that this approach to pricing
individual securities ignores systematic risks in a bond portfolio. It is likely
that default events of diverse ¯rms are correlated and coincide with cyclical
down-turns. This fact is ignored in an approach that treats the bond market
as consisting of a large number of isolated segments, each of which contains
benchmarks used for calibrating a model which in turn can be used to price the
other issues within the segment. Such an approach wastes potentially valuable
information deriving from the fact that yields across these segments are partially
driven by the same common factors. In contrast, a fundamental models can
readily take this into account when it is realized that ¯rm asset values may
conform to some multi-factor model.
For all of these reasons we feel there is a need for further empirical study
of structural models of corporate bonds. An additional reason for undertaking
this is that in recent years there has been renewed theoretical work in this area
designed to address the limitations encountered with past contingent claims
models. The original model of Merton [32] and most other contingent claims
analysis assumes that default occurs when the ¯rm's assets fall to an exogenous
absorbing barrier at which point the creditors immediately seize the assets of
the ¯rm, possibly net of some bankruptcy cost. This treatment of ¯nancial
distress is inconsistent with observed experience (see, for example, the papers
by Franks and Torous [16][17] and Weiss [35]). This shortcoming has given
rise to new models which determine the lower reorganization boundary of the
model endogenously. One approach has been to introduce a game-theoretic
model of the bankruptcy process and in this way address the determinants of
deviations from absolute priority (see, Anderson and Sundaresan [2], Anderson
3Sundaresan, and Tychon [3], Anderson, Pan, and Sundaresan [4] and Fan and
Sundaresan [14] ). An alternative, but closely related, approach builds on the
real options theory of investment decision and treats the liquidation decision
as an option (see, Mella-Barral and Perraudin [31]). A third line of modelling
follows Black and Cox [6] in assuming that debt service is paid by issuing new
equity; the endogenous bankruptcy point is the value of the ¯rm such that the
market price of equity drops to zero. (See, Leland [28] and Leland and Toft [29]).
While there are some similarities across models, their implications for pricing
can di®er signi¯cantly. To date there has been no attempt to discriminate
among these models on empirical grounds.
The purpose of the current study is to see to what extent these new models
are able to account for broad time series variations in observed yields of default-
able bonds. Secondarily, it attempts to identify which of the models ¯ts the
data best. Speci¯cally, we formulate a general model which takes the perpetual
coupon bond models of Merton (1974), Leland (1994) and Anderson, Sundare-
san and Tychon (1996), as well as some immediate generalizations thereof, as
special cases.1 We estimate these using aggregate time series data for the US
corporate bond market, monthly, from August 1970 through December 1996.
In the basic speci¯cation with constant default free rates, we ¯nd that models
with endogenous bankruptcy barriers (the Leland and the Anderson, Sundaresan
and Tychon models) ¯t quite well. Thus, in these models, variations of leverage
and asset volatility are found to account for much of the time-series variations
of observed corporate yields. In contrast, the Merton model which assumes an
exogenous bankruptcy barrier, does not perform well. When we consider the
alternative speci¯cation which allows for a time-varying default risk-free rate,
the performance of the Merton model improves. However, it is still dominated
by that of the endogenous bankruptcy models. We then use the estimates to
calculate the implied probability of default within N years. We ¯nd under
plausible assumptions on the market risk-premium for levered ¯rms that the
models produce default probabilities for 5 years or more which are in line with
the historical experience reported by Moody's.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe
the data. Section 3 develops the general theoretical model and shows how known
models from the literature are nested as special cases. Section 4 presents the
empirical estimates. Section 5 is devoted to our conclusions.
2 Data
One of the motivations for structural models of contingent claims is to provide a
link between corporate liabilities and their fundamental economic determinants.
1All these models take ¯rm value as the underlying stochastic process. In contrast the
model of Mella-Barral and Perraudin takes ¯rm sales as the driving process. Implementing
this would require a di®erent approach from that taken in the current paper.
4It is common place to regard equity values for a wide range of ¯rm as being
determined by a small number of common factors and ¯rm-speci¯c factors. It
is much less common to look upon the determinants of corporate bond yields
in a similar vein. However, in our view, it is likely that ¯nancial distress and
the recovery rates on claims of distressed ¯rms are both highly dependent on
systematic factors. However, by the nonlinear nature of debt like claims, the
sensitivity to these economic factors will vary signi¯cantly across di®erent claims
and over time. Lower grade claims that are closer to being distressed are likely
to be more sensitive to factors a®ecting equity values; while high grade claims
are mostly sensitive to changes in the risk-free term structure. The advantage
of structural models is that they are speci¯cally designed to re°ect this varying
sensitivity under changing circumstances.
One possible application of structural contingent claims models is to the
pricing of speci¯c bond issues of individual ¯rms. To do so one needs to draw
upon information on the asset volatility of the ¯rm, its capital structure and,
in principle, upon the speci¯c covenants of claim we are pricing and of other
claims. Working with this mass of information speci¯c to the ¯rm requires
considerable e®ort and tends to obscure the factors common across ¯rms. For
this reason we have chosen in the present study to implement structural models
using aggregate data. Intuitively, indices of corporate bond yields should be
more tightly linked to common economic factors, since by averaging the impact
of ¯rm-speci¯c factors will be eliminated. An additional advantage of working
with indices of bond yields is that liquidity premia are likely to be fairly constant
and therefore can be modelled relatively simply.2
We use observations of the generic corporate, on-the-run bond yields for
industrial corporations as reported in the Salomon Brothers Book of Analytical
Yields. This reports monthly observations of yields on 30 year bonds with S&P
ratings of AAA, A, and BBB for a relatively long time-period, from August




t respectively. It should be noted that by construction these yields are
averages of relatively newly issued bonds trading close to par.
During our sample period the U.S. experienced ¯ve recessions, a period of
double-digit in°ation, a major stock market crash, and a long period of sustained
non-in°ationary growth. In the ¯rst three lines of Table 1 we present descriptive
statistics for our sample of yields on AAA, A and BBB bonds respectively. It
should be noted that both the level of the yield and the volatility of yields
vary inversely with credit quality. Note that the autocorrelation coe±cients
with 1, 2, 3, and 12 month lags are all quite high raising the possibility that
the yield series are not stationary. In fact, much of the variation of corporate
yields over this period of more than 26 years is likely accounted for by changes
2It has long been recognized that part of the premium of corporate bond yields over Trea-
suries re°ects their relatively lower liquidity. (See Fisher [15] and Grinblatt [19]). However,
modelling of liquidity e®ects for corporate liabilities is relatively recent and has not yet settled
on the determinants of liquidity di®erences across ¯rms.
5in the default-free rate. To verify this we have calculated the spreads of the
corporate index over the 30 year U.S. Treasury yield, which we denote as rt.
Summary statistics are presented in lines 4-6 of Table 1. In the sample AAA
spreads average 71 basis points (b.p.'s). The comparable ¯gures for A and BBB
bonds are 124 b.p.'s and 184 b.p.'s. It should be noted that volatility of BBB
spreads is roughly twice that of AAA spreads. Indeed, over the sample the
BBB varied over a range of almost 300 b.p.'s. The autocorrelation coe±cients
of the spreads are lower than those of the yields suggesting that there may be a
stationary (cointegrating) relationship between corporate and default risk-free
yields. Still, these autocorrelation coe±cients are relatively high. This might
be explicable by the fact that the spreads depend upon other variables which
are themselves autocorrelated in the sample. Indeed, it is a basic premise of
structural models that the spread should depend upon such factors as leverage
and asset volatility as well as the default-free term structure.
Thus, in order to ¯t structural contingent claims models to monthly time
series of yields on generic U.S. corporate bonds, we construct monthly variables
to serve as proxies for leverage and asset volatility. Our leverage measures are
based on data contained in the annual aggregate balance sheets of non-¯nancial
corporations contained in the U.S. Federal Reserve's Flow of Funds Accounts.
These report various measures of total debt and of net worth. Debt ¯gures are
reported as book values. Net worth is reported at market value and is derived
as the residual of assets (measured at market value when available) less the
book value of liabilities. The accounts also report the total value of equities
based on market prices. An inspection of the net worth data reveal very little
variation from year to year thus suggesting that in fact they re°ect market
valuations only very imperfectly. In contrast, measures of the market value of
equity vary signi¯cantly and appear to hold more promise for accounting for
observed variations of corporate yields and yield spreads. Therefore, we have
concentrated our attention on leverage measures derived from the market value
of equity.
We construct a monthly series of the market value of equity from the annual
series by ¯rst calculating the monthly average growth rates from two successive
year-end ¯gures. We do the same thing for the S&P500 index. We then calculate
the deviation of the monthly growth rates of the S&P500 from the annual aver-
age. These monthly deviations are combined with the average monthly growth
rates of the aggregate market value of equity to obtain a monthly estimate of
market value of equity. By this method our estimate tracks monthly °uctua-
tions of the S&P500 but remains consistent with the annual data from the Flow
of Funds Accounts. Monthly debt ¯gures are obtained from annual ¯gures by
assuming constant geometric growth throughout the year. From these monthly
series we obtain monthly estimates of leverage as follows:
LEV=Total Liabilities/(Total Liabilities+Equity)3
3We also implemented the some of the models using alternative leverage proxies as follows:
6Among practitioners it is common to follow a variety of °ow-based ¯nancial
ratios in order to derive information about bond safety. Examples include cov-
erage ratios, pro¯tability ratios, and cash °ow ratios. In this spirit we have in-
vestigated some °ow-based aggregative measures of debt burden to see whether
they add to the explanatory power of structural models of corporate yields. In
particular from the U.S. National Income Accounts we used seasonally adjusted
measures of aggregate interest payments and corporate pro¯ts. Monthly es-
timates of levels were obtained by interpolation. These in turn were used to
construct a measure of interest burden as follows:
BURDEN=interest/pro¯ts
This information must be incorporated within the non-linear functional form
of the structural models. A convenient way to do this is to rescale BURDEN so
that it has magnitudes of variation comparable to LEV and to combine these
two measures linearly to yield a revised leverage measure which we denote as
LEV*.4 In the estimations we normalize ¯rm value to be unity so that LEV
and LEV* may be interpreted as an aggregate debt to asset ratio. We denote
our leverage observation in month t as Pt.
Our proxy for asset value volatility is derived from the market prices of
equity. Given a stock price index, It; we calculate the monthly returns Rt =
lnIt ¡ lnIt¡1. The volatility of equity returns in month t is calculated as the
standard deviation of returns over the 12 months ending in month t.. The
results reported here are based on the S&P500 index. We denote this by Àt.
For simplicity we take the ratio of asset volatility to equity volatility to be a
constant, a, so that the implied proxy for asset volatility is aÀt. The parameter
a is determined from the data.
3 A general structural model of corporate bonds
Structural models of corporate debt explain variations in the yield on a cor-
porate bond with given contractual features (e.g., term, coupon) in terms of
variations in ¯rm leverage and ¯rm asset volatility as well as variations in the
default-free term structure. While all structural models share this property, dif-
ferent structural models di®er in important details and can have very di®erent
implications for pricing. In order to compare models and to provide a frame-
work for testing, we introduce a general framework that gives rise to closed form
solutions for the case of perpetual coupon bonds and which nests the models of
Anderson, Sundaresan and Tychon (AST) [3], Leland [28], and Merton [32] as
special cases.
LEV1=Financial Debt/(Financial Debt+New Worth); LEV2=Financial Debt/(Financial
Debt+Equity); and LEV3=Total Liabilities/(Total Liabilities+New Worth).
The variables produced systematically worse ¯ts than those we report in the paper and are
not reported here.
4Speci¯cally,
LEV ¤ = 1:3LEV + :2ln(ln(BURDEN)):
7We consider a ¯rm whose assets have a value, V , which follows a stochastic
process,
dV = ¹(¯)V dt + ¾V dz (1)
where ¹ is the rate of return on ¯rm assets, ¯ is the cash °ow rate, ¾ is asset
volatility, and dz is a Wiener process. Assume zero corporate taxes. Assume a
°at, non-stochastic default-free term structure with a continuously compounded
rate of interest of r. We suppose that the ¯rm has issued a perpetual bond
with face value P promising a continuous coupon at rate c. Corporate bonds
carry the risk that the ¯rm will enter into bankruptcy. We assume that the
bankruptcy regime in e®ect allows for the possibility of default which does not
induce the liquidation of the ¯rm. Thus we suppose that the debt service °ow
actually received by the creditor will be of the state dependent form, s(V;c)dt.
If, however, bankruptcy results in liquidation the creditor will receive the assets
of the ¯rm net of any liquidation costs. We assume liquidation costs take the
general linear form, K + (1 ¡ µ)V where K and µ are constants. Thus at the
liquidation barrier the value of the bonds is given by,
B = Max(µV ¡K;0): (2)
Given these speci¯cations plus additional assumption concerning the drift
term, the bonds can be valued using standard techniques. All the models we




(1 ¡ Pd) + PdMax(µV ¤ ¡K;0) (3)
where we can interpret Pd as a probability of default and V ¤ as the default
barrier. Thus structural models can be viewed as all stating that the value of a
risky bond equals the value of a riskless bond times the probability of no default
plus the value of the collateral times the probability of default. Structural
models of perpetual coupon debt di®er with respect to how they assess the
probability of default and the value of collateral upon default.5 We now discuss
how special cases of this model correspond to the pepetuity models of Leland,
Anderson, Sundaresan and Tychon (AST), and Merton.
In both the Leland and AST frameworks the drift in equation (1) is assumed
to be (¹ ¡¯)V so that the value process follows a geometric Brownian motion.
In this case, since perpetual bonds do not depend directly upon time, they must
satisfy the ordinary di®erential equation,
1
2
¾2V 2BV V + (r ¡ ¯)V BV ¡ rB +s(V;c) = 0 (4)
5Note however that this gives a risk-neutral probability of default. In general it will not be
directly comparable to historical default rates.This issue is discussed below when we interpret
our estimates.
8where subscripts denote di®erentiation. For general speci¯cations of state de-
pendent debt service, s(V;c), and the liquidation boundary there is no known
closed form solution to this equation. However, the problem simpli¯es if for ¯rm
values in excess of some critical value, V ¤, the bondholder receives contractual
debt service at rate cP and if at the barrier, V ¤, the bondholder receives an
amount equivalent to the collateral value in equation 2. Note that if ¯rm value
attains the barrier V ¤, we do not necessarily assume that the ¯rm is liquidated.
Indeed in some structural models it is assumed that the ¯rm continues operat-
ing. For this reason we refer to V ¤ as the \default barrier". We will discuss
below how this barrier is determined in di®erent structural models. Under these
assumptions solutions to equation 4 are of the form,
B(V ) = A1V
°1 +A2V
°2 +U
where °1 > 1 and °2 < 0:6 A1, A2, and U are constants which may be chosen
to satisfy boundary conditions. We assume that as the value of the assets of
the ¯rm grow inde¯nitely large, the value of the bond tends toward that of





Thus using the fact that °1 > 1 we see that A1 = 0 and U = cP
r . The
second useful boundary condition is that at the default barrier, the value of the
bond must match that of the collateral 2. In this case it can be con¯rmed that
A2 =
Max(µV ¤ ¡K;0) ¡ cP
r
V ¤°2
This completes the solution for the value of a perpetual bond in this general




we see that this solution is precisely in the form given in equation (3). Note that
°2 < 0 so that 0 < Pd < 1. As V approaches V ¤ from above, this probability of
default approaches unity. The Leland and AST models are special case of this
framework which di®er with respect to the assumptions made about ¯nancial
distress which will imply a variety of di®erent values of V ¤.
Leland [28] assumes that asset liquidation is costly and that partial liquida-
tions of assets are not possible. Furthermore, he follows Black and Cox [6] in
assuming that contractual debt service is made through issues of new equity.
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9He considers two possible speci¯cations of the bankruptcy process. In one case
he assumes that a net worth covenant leads to the liquidation of the ¯rm when
the value of the assets of the ¯rm falls to the value of the debt when it was
originally issued. He views this formulation as approximating the arrangement
sometimes used for revolving lines of credit where the borrowing amount and
interest rate are ¯xed at inception. In the second, which he views as a more
plausible model of long-term debt, he assumes that debt is protected only by
the no-asset-sale covenant. We present this case here. He argues that the ¯rm
will pay contractual service on outstanding debt until the asset value falls to
the point where the value of equity is zero. At this point the ¯rm is liquidated,
and the bondholders receive the available collateral. He makes the further para-
metric assumptions that ¯ = 0 and K = 0. Under these assumptions he shows
that the liquidation (default) barrier is V ¤






Note that this default barrier (i) is proportional to the contractual debt ser-
vice, (ii) is independent of the current value of the assets of the ¯rm, (iii) does
not depend upon the marginal recovery rate parameter µ, and (iv) is decreasing
in level of volatility of assets. Furthermore, note that in this formulation the
shareholders do not default on the contract until equity falls to zero at which
point the ¯rm is liquidated. In other words, in bankruptcy there are no devia-
tions from absolute priority of claims. This feature of the model is unrealistic.
A number of studies have documented the fact that ¯nancial distress often re-
sults in deviations from absolute priority. In particular, Chapter 11 of the U.S.
bankruptcy code seems to allow substantial deviations in favor of common stock
(see Franks and Torous [16]). It remains to be seen, however, whether this fea-
ture of the model undermines its usefulness in predicting yields on long-term
corporate bonds for ¯rms far from ¯nancial distress.
It is possible to generalize the Leland framework to allow for a positive cash
payout rate, ¯, and for a ¯xed liquidation cost, K. Under these assumptions the









As in the case of the basic Leland model, the liquidation barrier is inde-
pendent of bankruptcy costs. The reason for this is easy to understand. Since
Leland assumes that equity holders receive nothing from the bankrupt ¯rm,
he implicitly assumes all bankruptcy costs (both ¯xed and marginal) accrue to
bondholders. Therefore, the asset value at which equity becomes worthless will
be independent of bankruptcy costs.
Anderson and Sundaresan [2] argue that in order to put the structural mod-
elling of corporate liabilities on solid foundations the starting point should be a
10serious consideration of the bankruptcy regime that applies to the ¯rm. Work-
ing in discrete time they show how a game-theoretic model of ¯nancial distress
can be imbedded in framework which readily allows valuation of corporate lia-
bilities using standard techniques. Many static bankruptcy models previously
seen in the corporate ¯nance literature could be adapted to this dynamic set-
ting. They illustrate the technique with a particular model which allows for
partial defaults of the debt contract which do not result in the ¯rm's liquida-
tion. Assuming that liquidation may involve a dead-weight loss for creditors,
they point out that shareholders may have an incentive to behave strategically
in under performing the debt contract even though available cash °ows would
allow them to pay full service. They show that this feature leads to deviations
from absolute priority. Speci¯cally, by under performing their debt contracts,
shareholders are able to increase equity values at the expense of reducing bond
values. However, it is not always possible for shareholders to ¯nd a reduction
in debt that bondholders will agree to, in which case the ¯rm is liquidation. By
assuming that debt service must be met out of available cash °ow, they show
that some states of the world will result in forced liquidation of the ¯rm. Thus
they show that the cash °ow rate, ¯, has a signi¯cant impact on bond yields
and indirectly upon capital structure and optimal security design
Anderson, Sundaresan and Tychon [3] link this game theoretic analysis to
more traditional contingent claim modelling by considering the limit of the
equilibrium in the discrete time game as the time step tends toward zero. For
the special case of perpetual bonds when the debt service may be met either out
of cash °ows or from new equity issues, they show that the model is a special
case of the model above. Their formulation allows only for ¯xed bankruptcy
cost and thus implicitly assumes that the marginal recovery rate is unity, µ = 1.
Allowing instead for general µ;it can be shown that the bond values are given









This default barrier is increasing in c and can be shown to be decreasing
in asset volatility, ¾2. However, unlike the default barrier found by Leland,
we ¯nd V ¤
AST is sensitive to the liquidation cost parameters. Speci¯cally it is
decreasing in the marginal recovery rate, µ and increasing in the dead-weight
liquidation cost, K. The economic interpretation of this is that the greater
costliness of liquidation, the greater is the shareholder ability to extract debt-
service concessions from creditors. The consequence of this feature is that the
bond yields for ¯rms for which liquidation is a very remote prospect may still
re°ect a signi¯cant premium to compensate for possible partial reductions in
debt service. Below we refer to the case of µ = 1 as the AST model and the
case of general µ as the generalized AST model.
In his analysis of perpetual coupon bonds Merton [32] assumes that contrac-
11tual debt service is met through asset liquidation and continues until such time
that all assets are exhausted. This implies that the drift of the asset process
is (¹V ¡c). Furthermore, in terms of the framework above this corresponds to















where ¡(:) is the gamma function and M(:) is the con°uent hypergeometric
function. Note that this formulation assumes that assets may be liquidated
freely and that such partial liquidations do not involve a loss of value. These
assumptions may be faulted as being counter-factual: bond covenants typically
do restrict asset sales, and distressed sales of assets may well involve a loss
of value. While we view this criticism as important, it remains possible that
Merton's formulation might be adequate for modelling bonds of ¯rms far from
¯nancial distress as would seem likely for the case of most investment grade
corporate bonds. As a result, we test the Merton restriction below.
It is worth noting that the Merton formulation can be modi¯ed to restrict
asset sales and to allow for costly liquidation. Fan and Sundaresan [14] show
that the optimal payout policy in the Merton model is zero dividends when there
is a covenant which precludes asset sales to fund coupons. Using this result, in

































Note that in the modi¯ed Merton model, the probability of liquidation de-
pends on the costs of liquidation.
We now turn to the estimation of the basic Leland, AST, and Merton models
using out time-series data set.
4 Results
As discussed in section 2, we are interested to ¯nd a stable relationship between
corporate yields and our aggregate measures of leverage and volatility. The
structural models of section 3 provide alternative forms of this possible rela-
tionship. We implement them empirically using the following estimable form,
yt = ¸ + y(Pt;aÀt;r;K;µ;¯) +ut
ut = ½ut¡1 +²t
12Here yt is the observed market yield for corporate bonds rated BBB. We have
focused on this rating category because of the greater volatility of BBB spreads
relative to higher grade issues and because we expect that structure models of
contingent claims are likely to be most useful for relatively lower grade issues.
The function y(:) is the yield implied by the bond value , B(:) calculated using
one of the structural models from Section 2 and is given by the formula, y =
cP=B. The variables Pt and aÀt are our proxies for leverage and asset volatility.
The ¯xed bankruptcy cost, K; the marginal recovery rate, µ, and the cash °ow
rate, ¯, are all treated as constants throughout the sample. All the models of
section 3 treated the default-free rate as non-stochastic. In this speci¯cation we
treat this as a constant, r:
A number of considerations lead us to include an additive constant, ¸, in
the model. First, this may re°ect a premium for the illiquidity of corporate
bond markets relative to Treasuries. Second, it may re°ect a tax e®ect, since
interest on Treasuries is tax deductible for many investors whereas interest on
corporates is not. Finally, if the speci¯cation of y(:) is biased in some respect,
the additive constant will correct for this. In the absence of a model of the
determinants of liquidity, it would be di±cult to decompose a given estimate ¸
of into these separate e®ects.
We have speci¯ed the residuals of the yield equation as following a ¯rst-order
autoregressive process. This may capture autocorrelation of yield spreads not
modeled with our proxies for leverage and asset volatility. Alternatively, it may
re°ect autocorrelation of liquidity premia.
We estimate the parameters ¸;a;r;K;µ;¯; and ½ by nonlinear least-squares.
The results of the estimates for the full sample are presented in the ¯rst panel
of Table 2. The R-square statistic indicate that the two endogenous bankruptcy
models ¯t the data equally well and that the Merton with a ¯xed bankruptcy
barrier ¯tsrather lesswell. Indeed, di±culty of this speci¯cation is also indicated
by the fact that the parameters ¸;a;and r all estimated with very large standard
errors. The only signi¯cant e®ect is found to be the autoregressive parameter,
½.
In the AST model all the parameter estimates are signi¯cant. The point
estimates of a;r;K; and ¯ are economically plausible; although, the estimated
bankruptcy cost of 22% appears on the high side. The estimated value of ¸
is negative suggesting that this parameter is partially correcting for an upward
bias of the AST form in this sample. The estimated autoregressive parameter
is .83. While this is rather less than the observed autocorrelation of the BBB
yield spreads; it suggests that the time-series variation of yield spreads is not
fully accounted for by our proxies for leverage and asset volatility.
The parameter estimates of the Leland model are all signi¯cant. The co-
e±cient a is estimated to be .91 which suggests that the Leland model must
assume approximately twice the asset volatility as does the AST model in order
to account for the variations observed in the sample. The estimated marginal
recovery rate is -152% of asset value, which is economically implausible.
13In the ¯rst panel we report summary statistics for the spreads calculated
from the models based on the full sample. The mean spreads from the estimated
models are all close to that observed in the market implying that the models
are all unbiased. However, the standard deviations of the estimated spreads,
especially for the Merton model, exceed those of the market spread. The ¯tted
spreads of the Leland model have a simple correlation with the market of .22;
while that of the AST model is .13. The spreads of the Merton model are
negatively correlated with the market.
The plots of the market spreads (spbbb) and the ¯tted spread (sbm) are
presented in Figures 1-3 for the AST, Leland and Merton models respectively. In
Figure 1 we see that at times the AST model is able to track market movements
very well. At other times the model and the market drift widely apart. This
is particularly apparent in the middle of the sample, corresponding to the end
of the 1970's and early 1980's. The same remark applies to the Leland model
(Figure 2); although, here the over all ¯t is somewhat better than in the AST
model. In the case of the Merton model (Figure 3) there are fewer periods when
the model tracks the data well.
Overall, these plots suggest the possibility of regime shifts which make it
hard to match the models to the market over the entire sample. We investigate
this idea by splitting the sample into 3 periods with breaks at October 1979
(coinciding with a major shift in monetary policy in the United States) and in
June 1984 (following a period of recession and exceptionally high interest rates).
The models were reestimated on these subsamples and the results are presented
in Table 2, panels 2, 3 and 4. These results do indicate three distinctly di®erent
periods. The parameter estimates of the models vary signi¯cantly across the
periods as does their goodness of ¯t.
In the period August 1970 through October 1979, the AST model ¯ts the
data best. The bankruptcy parameters and the cash °ow estimates are lower
than for the overall sample. In this model the autoregressive parameter has
fallen to .56 suggesting that movements of leverage and volatility are tracking
much of the observed variation of BBB yields within this period. The Leland
model ¯ts the data less well, and the Merton model is still worse.
During the period from November 1979 through June 1984, all the models
have a hard time of tracking the observed movements of corporate yields. In
all the models, especially the Merton model, the estimated standards errors are
large indicating that the model parameters are not precisely determined by the
data.
In the ¯nal subsample (July 1984-December 1996), theendogenousbankruptcy
models perform quite well. The R-squares exceed 90%, and the model param-
eters are estimated quite precisely. Furthermore, the estimated autoregressive
parameters equal 0.63, so that leverage and volatility are accounting for much of
the observed variation of BBB yields. The Merton model continues to perform
poorly during this subsample.
The performance of the models is also indicated in Table 3 where summary
14statistics of the calculated yield spreads are compared with the observed yield
spreads in the market. During the ¯rst and last subsamples the Leland and
AST models are highly correlated with the market. The spreads ¯tted from the
Merton model are fairly highly correlated with the market in the ¯rst subsample
but are negatively correlated in the last subsample. In the intermediate sample,
all the models are negatively related to the market.
Overall these results suggest that the recent e®orts to modify the contingent
claims model to allow for the endogenous determination of the default barrier
based on economic fundamentals have led to an improvement of structural mod-
els. We saw in section 3 that the assumptions of the AST model and the Leland
model were quite di®erent. In particular, the AST model allows for the possibil-
ity of debt renegotiations resulting in deviations from absolute priority whereas
the Leland model does not. Despite these di®erences of starting points we found
that the models were fairly close in their abilities to track observed generic yields
using aggregate proxies for leverage, asset volatility and the risk-free rate.
In the estimates above we found evidence that the constant default-free rate
speci¯cation of the model was too restrictive. When we broke the sample into
three separate periods we found the parameter estimates changed substantially
and in some cases the ¯ts improved considerably. It must be recognized that
the break points of the sample which we chose were somewhat arbitrary. Thus
we now investigate a version of the model with a time-varying, default-free rate
speci¯cation,
yt = ¸ + y(Pt;aÀt;rt;K;µ;¯) +ut
where rt is the 12 month moving average of 30 year Treasury yields through
month t. This model has been estimated for the full sample (7/71-12/96), and
the results have been reported in Table 4.
Parameter estimates of the models are presented in the ¯rst panel of the
table. It will be noted that overall goodness of ¯t is improved by the introduc-
tion of time-varying default-free rates. The performance of the Merton model is
particularly improved. Now, its parameters are estimated quite precisely, and
the autocorrelation of the residuals has fallen to be in line with that obtained
in the endogenous bankruptcy models. In this version the point estimate of
bankruptcy costs in the AST model is about 4% which is quite plausible. With
an estimated marginal recovery rate of 95% the Leland model implies very sim-
ilar bankruptcy costs. It is interesting that in comparing the estimates of a
across models we see that the Merton model requires the highest levels of asset
volatility to ¯t the data, the AST requires the lowest asset volatilities, while the
Leland model is intermediate between the two. We can also compare estimates
of ¸ across models. Here all the estimates are of the same sign and same order of
magnitude suggesting that the time-varying default-free rate speci¯cation may
have eliminated a source of bias encountered in the previous speci¯cation. As-
suming the resulting parameter is an estimate of the combined tax and liquidity
premia of corporate bonds, we see that the Merton model estimates these to
15be 180 b.p.'s, while they are 160 b.p.'s and 150 b.p.'s in the Leland and AST
models respectively.
The second panel of Table 4, presents the summary statistics on the calcu-
lated spreads over 30 year Treasury Bonds. It is seen that all the models are
unbiased and have comparable volatilities. The correlation with the market is
somewhat higher for the AST model than for the Leland model. In this speci¯-
cation, the Merton model attains a correlation that is only slightly worse than
the endogenous bankruptcy model.
The results of the models with time-varying default-free rates are seen graph-
ically in Figures 4-6. When compared to Figures 1-3, it will be noted that the
models now are able to roughly track the observed spreads throughout the en-
tire sample. Visually, the ¯ts of all three models to the observed spreads are
quite similar to one another. Apparently, the time series variations in the level
of default free rates enables the models to track the spreads of corporate rates
over Treasuries independently of the models' abilities to incorporate informa-
tion on variations of leverage and volatility. Furthermore, it appears that, once
the time-varying default-free rate is taken into account, the relative superiority
of endogenous bankruptcy models over the ¯xed bankruptcy barrier model is
diminished somewhat.
Finally, we think it is interesting to study the implications of the models for
the probability of default and to try to compare these to historically observed
default frequencies. Speci¯cally for each set of parameter estimates and for each
month's combination of leverage, volatility, and risk-free rate, we have simulated
by Monte Carlo 1000 paths of the asset process over 20 years. From this we have
calculated the frequency that the model hits the model's default barrier within
1-5, 10, 15, and 20 years. It is interesting to compare these predictions with his-
torical experience. Recently, Moody's has published the results of an extensive
study of default rates from 1920 through 1996 [33] The benchmark produced by
the model estimates are not directly comparable to historical ¯gures since they
are calculated on the basis of the risk-neutral probabilities. The calculation of
comparable probabilities would require knowledge of the asset drift parameter,
¹: We have approximated this by assuming that this drift re°ects a constant
risk premium, ±, over the risk-free rate so that the drift in month t is calculated
as, ¹t = rt +±.
In ¯gure 7, the results of the simulations of the AST model estimated as-
suming time-varying default-free rates are reported for ± = 5% and ± = 0%
(i.e., the risk neutral case). In the same ¯gure, we plot the historical N-year
cumulative default probabilities reported for bonds with Moody's rating of Baa
at N=0 [33]. In the case of a zero risk premium the AST model implies default
probabilities which greatly exceed the historical observations. However, with
positive risk-premia the model implies lower default probabilities. We see that
assuming a 5% risk premium results in default probabilities which are reason-
ably close to the Moody's ¯gures. However, the ¯t is certainly not perfect. The
AST default probabilities are too high at 1 -5 years and too low at 20 years.
16Stated otherwise, ¯tted probabilities of default conditional on no-default prior
to 5 years are too low compared to historical experience.Delianedis and Geske
[9] in a recent paper have used the Merton [32] and Geske [18] models to ex-
tract risk-neutral default probabilities. Such an approach can lead potentially
to better estimates of the probability of rating migrations and defaults.
Finally, as a further comparison with historical observations we may note
that, even though they allow for costly bankruptcy, the AST and Leland models
are not entirely satisfactory in that they imply that recovery rates on defaulted
bonds are quite high relative to actual experience. For example, Altman and
Kishore [1] report that the recovery rates on investment grade issues of senior
unsecured debt are 48% of principal. In contrast the ¯tted AST and Leland
models imply average recovery rates somewhat over 90%.
5 Conclusion
Overall, these empirical results are fairly encouraging for the prospects of ¯rm-
value-based structural models of contingent claims as the basis for studying
the pricing of corporate bonds. Most of the movements observed in historical
times series of yields on generic corporate bonds can be accounted for in struc-
tural models using proxies for leverage and asset volatility derived from the
Flow of Funds Accounts and the stock market. The results suggest that recent
modi¯cations (by Anderson/Sundaresan and Leland )of the contingent claims
models to allow for endogenous default barriers have signi¯cantly improved the
performance of the models.
This study is exploratory in nature, and there are clearly many interesting
areas for further empirical work with structural models. Our analysis has been
simpli¯ed by theassumption that the bonds are perpetual coupon bonds without
call features and that the only underlying state variables is the value of the
assets of the ¯rm. This has allowed us to use closed-form expression for the
value of the bonds. Even using fast numerical techniques it would have been
very di±cult to carry out the huge number of bond valuations involved in the
nonlinear regressions (Tables 1-3) without making this assumption. Probably,
the assumption of an in¯nite horizon has been fairly innocuous. As a check we
used our parameter estimates of the AST model to numerically calculate the
corresponding bond yields for a 10 year bond. The resulting time series of yields
for 317 months was virtually identical to those we have presented in the paper.
Among the avenues which appear relatively more important to be explored
are the incorporation of a stochastic risk-free term structure in a model with en-
dogenous bankruptcy barrier, more careful modelling of the liquidity premium,
and application to speci¯c bond issues using ¯rm speci¯c measures of leverage
and asset volatility.
176 Appendix 1: Derivation of Generalized Mer-
ton Model
We prohibit asset sales in the Merton model and introduce a cash °ow covenant
which says that the ¯rm is liquidated when the cash °ow generated is insu±-
cient to pay the contractual coupon. This modi¯cation leads to the implication
that the optimal dividend payout policy is to pay no dividends. (See Fan and
Sundaresan).
Given this optimal payout condition, we know that the risk-neutral stochas-
tic process followed by the ¯rm's assets is
dV = (rV ¡c)dt + V ¾dB (11)
Then, the fundamental valuation equation is:
1
2
¾2V 2DV V +(rV ¡c)DV ¡rD + c = 0:
De¯ne Z = 2c=¾2V , R = 2r=¾2 and D(V ) = c
r + ZRe¡Zh(Z).
Let G(V ) = ZRe¡Zh(Z).
This reduces to Kummer's equation:
ZhZZ +(2 + R ¡ Z)hZ ¡2h = 0
which has general solution of the form
C1M(2;2 +R;Z) + C2Z¡1¡RM(1 ¡R;¡R;Z)
where C1 and C2 are constants to be determined by the boundary conditions.








M(2r=¾2V;2 + 2r=¾2;¡2c=¾2V )
+C2(¾2V=2c)M(¡1;¡2r=¾2V;¡2c=¾2V )
We use two boundary conditions:
1. When V goes to 1,
D(V ) goes to c
r.
This requires that C2 = 0.
2. When V goes to c
¯,
D(V ) goes to (1 ¡ ®)V ¡ K




























18where ¡(¢) is the gamma function and M(¢;¢;¢) is the con°uent hypergeometric
function. Debt value and the total ¯rm value are both maximized by choosing
minimum payout.
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21Table 1: Descriptive Statistics, 30-year, Risky Yields and Spreads over Treasuries; 8/70-12/96
Mean St. Dev. Min Max AR-1 AR-2 AR-3 AR-12
Yaaa 0.0938 0.0213 0.0665 0.1650 0.9818 0.9608 0.9404 0.7730
Ya 0.0991 0.0232 0.0700 0.1763 0.9826 0.9638 0.9451 0.7829
Ybbb 0.1051 0.0246 0.0725 0.1850 0.9831 0.9647 0.9455 0.7587
Spaaa 0.0071 0.0036 -0.0005 0.0193 0.9027 0.8629 0.8229 0.5116
Spa 0.0124 0.0048 0.0030 0.0259 0.9165 0.8811 0.8444 0.4608
Spbbb 0.0184 0.0070 0.0081 0.0375 0.9386 0.8988 0.8546 0.3667Table 2: Estimation Results
Perpetual Models with Constant Implied Default-free Rate




Merton 0.34 -0.04 0.14 0.90 0.69
937803 17980 17962 0.02
AST 0.45 0.22 -0.09 0.19 0.17 0.83 0.82
0.09 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.03
Leland 0.91 0.07 -1.52 0.01 0.81 0.82
0.09 0.003 0.09 0.001 0.03
(8/70
-10/79)
Merton 0.30 -0.04 0.09 0.76 0.59
525368 2320.03 2317.71 0.07
AST 1.11 0.08 -.05 0.16 0.12 0.56 0.85
0.61 0.38 0.08 0.15 0.08 0.08
Leland 0.91 0.07 -1.52 0.01 0.81 0.82
0.09 0.003 0.09 0.001 0.03
(11/79-
6/84)
Merton 0.30 0.03 0.12 0.78 0.59
768810 18606 18588 0.08
AST 0.17 0.03 -0.15 0.30 0.29 0.82 0.62
0.34 0.25 1.35 1.42 1.35 0.08
Leland 0.60 0.06 0.77 0.08 0.82 0.62
2.12 0.66 2.06 0.66 0.08
(7/84-
12/96)
Merton 0.30 0.00 0.09 0.77 0.61
549929 2138.07 2135.93 0.06
AST 0.38 0.25 -0.04 0.13 0.11 0.63 0.90
0.06 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.07
Leland 0.77 0.07 -1.60 0.00 0.63 0.91
0.06 0.002 0.06 0.0004 0.07










1st Quartile Median 3rd Quartile
Full Sample
Market 0.0184 0.007 1.0 0.0125 0.0172 0.0227
Merton 0.0185 0.011 -0.09 0.0126 0.0199 0.0259
AST 0.0186 0.009 0.13 0.0134 0.0182 0.0237
Leland 0.0185 0.009 0.22 0.0128 0.0176 0.0245
(8/70-
10/79)
Market 0.0183 0.008 1.0 0.0112 0.0159 0.0242
Merton 0.0184 0.0083 0.582 0.0114 0.0169 0.0253
AST 0.0183 0.0080 0.845 0.0121 0.0156 0.0230
Leland 0.0183 0.0080 0.845 0.0120 0.0157 0.0233
(11/79-
6/84)
Market 0.0232 0.0064 1.0 0.01788 0.0229 0.0281
Merton 0.0229 0.0076 -0.205 0.01862 0.0220 0.0266
AST 0.0228 0.0072 -0.169 0.01696 0.0229 0.0274
Leland 0.0228 0.0074 -0.139 0.01774 0.0231 0.0280
(7/84-
12/96)
Market 0.0162 0.0043 1.0 0.0126 0.01525 0.0195
Merton 0.0164 0.0061 -0.145 0.01326 0.01657 0.0198
AST 0.0162 0.0054 0.686 0.01231 0.01517 0.0188








Merton 0.907 0.018 0.741 0.931
0.100 0.001 0.039
AST 0.545 0.041 0.015 0.068 0.753 0.933
0.099 0.013 0.002 0.019 0.038
Leland 0.801 0.016 0.948 0.756 0.933












Market 0.018 0.007 1 0.0125 0.0169 0.0216
Merton 0.018 0.006 0.479 0.0139 0.0175 0.0217
AST 0.018 0.006 0.522 0.0136 0.0168 0.0219















































































































































Risk-Neutral Probability Probability at a Risk Premium=5% Moody's Probability